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 The Genesis of the Sonderweg 
 
The age: everything that has appeared in the War and after the War was already there. 
-- Musil, Tagebücher 
 
 Since Germany’s defeat in 1945, scholars have debated the place of National 
Socialism in German history and the role continuity plays in telling the larger German 
story.  This is no mere object of idle curiosity, since the very legitimacy of the modern, 
peaceful, and democratic Federal Republic of Germany has always hinged on its ability 
to distance itself from the violence and illiberalism of the Third Reich.   Such an 
undertaking has naturally led historians to ask whether the Nazi dictatorship represented a 
short-lived aberration in an otherwise linear progression towards a democratic state, or 
rather a horrific denouement to a longer tradition of authoritarianism and bellicosity.  
Thus the key problem for scholars in today’s Germany, as Konrad Jarausch explains, is to 
account for “the incommensurability of simultaneous man-made life-worlds of utter 
privilege, wealth, and consumption and death-worlds of utter degradation, starvation, and 
brutal annihilation.”1 
 One way scholars respond to this dilemma is through the concept of a German 
Sonderweg, or “separate path.”  This term refers to a modernization paradigm with 
origins in the polemical writings of Fritz Fischer and Hans-Ulrich Wehler in the 1960s 
and 1970s. They suggested that long-term deviations in German modernization in the 
nineteenth century serve to explain the rise of Nazism in the twentieth. The subsequent 
historiography surrounding Germany and the Third Reich has created so-called “master 
narratives,” which attempt to interpret German history on a large scale, as accounts of the 
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 ways in which modern industrialization and tradition coalesced in the German Empire to 
produce a powerful nation-state with an inclination towards war in 1914 and a public 
rejection of democracy in 1933.  In this way, the Sonderweg thesis represents a 
meaningful contribution to the larger task of coming to terms with Nazism and the 
extremities of the Holocaust. 
This study will first lay out the course of the German Sonderweg in post-1945 
historiography, the intent being to construct a clear assessment of the thesis as it has 
evolved over the past fifty years.  In doing so, this study will address how and why the 
Sonderweg thesis has been heavily criticized in the past few decades by scholars who 
complain about its attempt on the one hand to normalize the histories of other Western 
nations,2 and on the other to see every episode of the past 250 years as leading to the 
Third Reich and the Holocaust.3  Intense debate over the Sonderweg thesis has lasted for 
over two decades, and this scrutiny has led to a decline in the Sonderweg’s explanatory 
power. As a result, historians such as Helmut Walser Smith are left to bemoan the 
absence of viable explanatory alternatives to fill the gap left by a discredited Sonderweg.4  
To understand why this beleaguered thesis has endured such intense controversy, this 
project begins by asking why the notion of a “separate path” has been so deeply ingrained 
in contemporary thought, and to discover when, where, and in what form the notion of a 
“separate path” took hold in Germany.   
Much more than a simple reconstruction of previous Sonderweg debates, this 
study intends to break down the various diagnoses offered as a solution to Germany’s ills 
by turning away from postwar historians to focus specifically on treatises published by 
leading German intellectuals throughout the Weimar period (1919-1933).  This study 
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 applies Fritz Fischer and Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s understandings of the Sonderweg to the 
pre-Nazi era, exploring the existence of a specifically Weimar Sonderweg and analyzing 
the ways in which the concept of a German Sonderweg differed between the 1920s and 
the postwar period.  From this premise, this project will analyze three prominent German 
intellectuals of the Weimar period: the artist Hugo Ball, the novelist Thomas Mann, and 
the essayist Robert Musil.  Beyond their public presence and wealth of publications, these 
three intellectuals offered valuable critiques of the Weimar period predicated on their 
own singular understandings of the German past, and their writings would go on to shape 
notions of German identity in the following decades.    It is this paper’s argument that the 
Weimar era constitutes a significant moment in the construction of a specifically 
twentieth-century German identity and that notions of a German Sonderweg heavily 
informed the intellectual capital produced throughout the period. 
The Course of the Sonderweg 
According to Helmut Walser Smith, 1941, among the other markers of the 
Germany past (1914, 1918, 1933, 1939, 1945), is the “vanishing point” of German 
history;5 it is the moment around which decades of postwar historiography have revolved.  
In reconciling the postwar period with the Final Solution, many historians utilized the 
Sonderweg thesis as a means of contextualizing the Third Reich within a broader German 
history.  Wielded as a methodological tool, the Sonderweg thesis became a significant 
paradigm of historical thinking which has transformed present-day interpretations of 
German history as a whole.  As a result, the past fifty years of German historiography 
have consistently dealt with the Sonderweg on some level or another.  Helmut Walser 
Smith’s most recent work claims that the era of the Sonderweg has at last come to a close, 
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 yet without an alternative narrative in place to structure our views of the German past, the 
Sonderweg remains a powerful teleological device for explaining German actions in the 
twentieth century. The following lays out the course of the Sonderweg thesis in postwar 
historiography, emphasizing how conventional understandings of the thesis have become 
embedded in our historical consciousness as part of a greater German saga.  These 
historiographical trends help explain why the Sonderweg is a narrative to which many 
continue to cling. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many German intellectuals 
believed in the existence of a positive “German way.”6  In general, the notion of a 
“special path” meant that the German-speaking lands had taken a route from aristocracy 
to democracy that was unlike any other in Europe, as a midway between the materialism 
and utilitarianism of the Western democratic systems on the one hand, and the autocracy 
of Tsarist Russia on the other.7  In the nineteenth century, this course was a source of 
pride.  The German path represented a distinctive form of democratization that occurred 
as a movement “from above,” in contrast to the grassroots democratic movements that 
played out in Britain and France, with reform occurring “from below.”  The German 
authoritarian state enacted reform of its own accord, and Germans citizens considered 
this path a superior alternative.  With unification in 1871 came a tendency to exalt a 
particular German combination of political, economic, military, and educational 
institutions.  As a whole, the German monarchy and the nation’s industrial success, 
alongside its army and universities, were tied to a positive historical paradigm that 
understood German history as a road to success.8  With the turn of the twentieth century, 
the ideas of the Imperial Age transitioned into modernity, and the “ideas of 1914” were 
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 linked to the understanding of a positive Sonderweg, tying the concept to the First World 
War and retaining powerful purchase throughout the Weimar years.9   
Pushed beyond recognition by Nazi zealots, however, this positive perception of 
the German Sonderweg lost much of its intellectual credibility and moral authority in the 
postwar world.  As a consequence, German tendencies towards the military and 
authoritarianism have been labeled the “peculiarities” of German history.10  The 
resonance and importance attached to these peculiarities has been examined critically in 
the postwar period. With the defeat of Germany in 1945, scholars asked how the German 
catastrophe had been possible. During the immediate postwar period the German 
population maintained varying images of the Third Reich as a time of order and 
prosperity, and this ambivalence left a mark on the professional sector.11  Much of the 
historical research produced in Germany throughout the 1950s explored a predominately 
political focus detailing the collapse of Weimar, the Nazi seizure of power, and the 
unleashing of the Second World War.  Within Germany an embattled politics of memory 
emerged – Germans who were prepared to accept Hitler’s responsibility for the Second 
World War found it hard to reopen the question of war guilt for the First World War.12  
Thus, much of the original critique that linked the German peculiarities of the nineteenth 
century to the atrocities of the twentieth came from historians outside of Germany, such 
as Pierre Renouvin, Bernadotte Schmitt, and Luigi Albertini.13  These scholars focused 
on specific peculiarities: some concentrated on the happenstance of geography, on 
Germany’s fatal position between east and west on the European continent; others 
expanded upon a German exceptionalism that was enacted via military force; and still 
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 others detailed a peculiar German mind warped by irrationalism, the glorification of 
martial values, obedience by the subject, and contempt for Western values.14   
In Germany, Fritz Fischer’s 1961 analysis of German war aims in the First World 
War broke the historiographical mold.15  Regarded as the first German historian to 
recognize the need for a critical review of German actions during the First World War, 
Fischer placed responsibility for the start of the conflict squarely on the shoulders of the 
Imperial German government.  Fischer posited that the Great War was a culmination of 
Germany’s “will to power.”16  In Fischer’s view, the German Empire created in 1871 was 
a partnership between the Prussian military and an authoritarian state administration, 
which, according to Fischer, determined Germany’s passage into modernity and hinged 
on a world policy dedicated to securing Germany a place in the sun no matter what the 
cost.  This will to power, then, necessitated military conquest as a means of safeguarding 
Germany’s social, cultural, and political heritage and a way to guarantee the balance of 
power in a new world system of states. As a result, German world policy was, in 
Fischer’s view, in no small measure responsible for the imminent danger of a general war 
in the summer of 1914. Fischer pointed to German politicians and publicists, “and with 
them the entire German propaganda machine during the war,” as warmongers.17  As such, 
the cornerstone of his thesis involved a total reversal of the nineteenth-century notion of a 
positive Sonderweg. 
According to Fritz Fischer, the defeat of Germany in 1918 did not then engender a 
wholesale reassessment of German identity.  Rather it “preserved in the following two 
decades a political and historical image [of Germany] which was colored by illusions.”18  
Given such a long-standing historical trend, Fischer’s work posed a significant challenge 
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 to several widespread German views.  The first was an assumption that Germany had 
fought a defensive war, and had only done so because it believed that its very existence 
was in jeopardy. The second followed David Lloyd George’s dictum that all the great 
powers had “slithered into the cauldron of war,” meaning that all the powers – Britain, 
France, Russia, and Germany – shared similar responsibility for the outbreak of 
conflict.19  As a whole, Fischer challenged the “comfortable interpretations” of previous 
German scholarship and reopened questions that many regarded as closed.20  Germany’s 
War Aims of the First World War suggested a reinterpretation of German policies from 
1914 to 1918 that linked tendencies of the nineteenth century to Germany’s failures in the 
twentieth.  Fischer drew connections from 1871 to 1945, and claimed that the policies 
pursued by the Nazis throughout the Third Reich were reflected in widely held German 
aspirations which long predated Hitler.  The questions raised by Fischer’s work 
concerned the role of continuity in German history; it was an interpretation of the recent 
German past constructed within a framework that adequately explained the socio-political 
processes behind the decisions that led to the Second World War.21  More importantly, it 
implicated the German people in Hitler’s war crimes.  As such, this singular 
interpretation of the German past “comes close to making the Holocaust inevitable in 
Germany.”22 
The reaction to Fischer’s work was dubbed the “Fischer Controversy.”  Generally 
regarded as the beginning of a critical perspective of the German past, assessments of the 
controversy differ in drastic ways.23  Within Germany, Fischer was faced with a 
campaign coordinated among leading German historians to reject his thesis.24  Gerhard 
Ritter, regarded as Fischer’s arch-critic and part of an older generation of German 
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 historians, believed that the war-guilt question was an issue of the past, having settled any 
disputes with the Franco-German school book agreement of 1951.25 This agreement made 
it possible to instill a historical consensus, pre-Fischer, which allowed shared culpability 
for the war of 1914 between the great powers and isolated the Third Reich from German 
history, preferring to interpret it as a Betriebsunfall (accident) and Hitler as a one-time 
aberration.26  Fischer’s thesis, of German Alleinschuld (sole responsibility), carried strong 
moral overtones, and according to many of Ritter’s colleagues, this view amounted to a 
betrayal of German patriotism and a threat to the German consciousness.27   
Ritter’s generation of scholars dominated the German Zunft (guild of historians). 
At any other point in time Fritz Fischer’s thesis might have been simply rejected by the 
historical majority and forgotten.  However, time and circumstance were against Ritter 
and his following.  The “Fischer-Kontroverse” became tied to both the Eichmann and 
Auschwitz trials, and as the controversy wore on, it played an important role in both the 
fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Great War and the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
the Second World War. Journalists latched onto the controversy surrounding Fischer’s 
book, highlighting the work’s appeal to both the historical expert as well as the interested 
public, and the growing positive reaction in the media made it impossible for the Zunft to 
ignore the book or attempt to sideline Fischer. Thus, Germany’s history was no longer 
left solely to the academic historians and their professional journals.  The media made the 
controversy available to the wider public, and the pro-contra debate surrounding 
Fischer’s thesis aired widely.  As a result, Fischer’s negative Sonderweg thesis seized the 
national German consciousness, and, in an interesting twist, the historiographical debate 
the thesis then engendered was more significant than Fischer’s study itself. For younger 
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 German historians, “Fischer’s writings were a declaration of independence,” and debate 
about the Sonderweg went on to influence and shape the arguments of further generations 
of German scholarly work.28   
The “Fischer Controversy” went on to inspire various theses which sought to 
provide a critical metanarrative of German history.29  Fritz Fischer’s model of a German 
Sonderweg that deviated significantly from the route taken by Western societies has 
gained wide currency in modern historical and political literature and has come to serve 
as the foundation of a new, critical approach to German history.30   Published in 1973, 
Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s The German Empire broke fresh ground on the Sonderweg 
debate.31  Wehler’s work analyzed the historical processes of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries in Germany, and organized them under themes of class, economics, 
and politics, creating an inventory of serious historical problems.  Wehler emphasized 
patterns of continuity in the German social fabric from the Second Empire to the Third 
Reich, and the general thread running throughout his analysis is the view that knowledge 
of the German Empire between 1871 and 1918 remains indispensable for understanding 
German history in the twentieth century.32  In Wehler’s view, a social structure that 
impeded modernization in some areas while allowing it in others dominated Germany 
between 1871 and 1945. Wehler described the German Empire as “a Bonapartist 
dictatorship based on plebiscitary support and operation within the framework of a semi-
absolutist, pseudo-constitutional monarchy.”33  He believed that a disastrous course had 
been set for the entire direction of the German Empire, and that the social, economic, and 
psychic structures of the Kaiserreich acted as matrices and were able to produce similar 
configurations over a long period of time.34  The key explanatory concept behind 
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 Wehler’s thesis was the assumption of a defensive method of modernization, which 
attempted to safeguard as many of the older, economic, social, political, and cultural 
patterns as possible.35  
Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s work is the prime example of a particular “Bielefeld 
School” approach, which judged that “however long and circuitous,” the “fateful 
Sonderweg of the Germans” led from Bismarck to Hitler.36  Wehler meant to illustrate 
how the political realities of the Kaiserreich had taken a “hazardous leap forward… 
[which led] the nation up a blind alley… [and would] lead to its downfall.”37  Among the 
first of Wehler’s critics were Thomas Nipperdey, Lothar Gall, and Klaus Hildebrand.38  
Nipperdey argued that Wehler was too willing to portray the aristocratic nature of the 
Kaiserreich in a negative hue; Gall criticized Wehler’s “Bonapartist” bent; Hildebrand 
rejected Wehler’s structural “social history” outright.39  However, Wehler’s 
understanding of the exceptionalist nature of German modernization succeeded in 
creating a critical view of the German past that was shared by a wider intellectual public, 
providing “innovative impulses, intellectual coherence, and polemical vigor that proved 
well nigh irresistible.”40  
Konrad Jarausch cites the unexpected economic transformations and cultural 
shifts of the 1980s as the catalysts that “appeared to announce the end of modernity as a 
distinctive, two-century long era.”41  Modernity came to be seen as the source of 
Germany’s problem, rather than its solution.  In 1984, David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley 
offered perhaps the greatest challenge to what previous critics had dubbed the “new 
orthodoxy” of German historical thought.42  Both British historians at odds with the 
notion that their country’s past served as positive standard of modernization, Blackbourn 
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 and Eley began their Peculiarities of German History by probing the normative 
assumptions which proponents of the Sonderweg inherently made about proper historical 
development.  The debate largely targeted the form of domestic politics, whether 
manipulation from above or grassroots mobilization from below had instigated change in 
the Second Reich.  According to Hans-Ulrich Wehler and the Bielefeld School, it was 
Germany’s lack of modernity that determined its subsequent disasters – that the 
antiquated nature of a feudal administration crippled Germany as it moved into the 
twentieth century.  Conversely, David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley emphasized the 
modernity of the Kaiserreich.  Their main critique focused on the existence of the 
Bürgertum (middle class) in Germany throughout the unification period and the social 
and political effects their liberal mindset had on the new regime.  In Blackbourn and 
Eley’s analysis, the commonly held “peculiarity,” that there was a gaping hole where the 
bourgeoisie should have been in Imperial Germany, was an illusion.43  In a wider 
European perspective, German modernization did not look nearly so exceptional and 
seemed to follow a pattern of economic, political, and social development typical of 
countries on the continent.44 
What remains significant about Peculiarities is that it did not challenge the 
Bielefeld notion of continuity between the Kaiserreich and Third Reich, and by extension 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Blackbourn and Eley did not deny the continuities 
of German history that comprised the backbone of the Sonderweg thesis.  However, they 
rejected the belief that Hitler was a historical aberration and refused to acknowledge the 
view of Hitler as a “snake charmer” who seduced a German people driven to despair by 
the immediate circumstances of the Versailles Treaty, 1920s’ inflation, and 1930s’ 
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 depression.45  They argued not whether continuity existed, but instead which form it took.  
Rather than reduce the nineteenth century to “the ante-room of Nazism,” a method that 
Blackbourn and Eley find too frequently used and too comfortable, they instead 
demonstrated the similarities in both theory and practice between the politics of the 
Weimar Republic and the politics of the Wilhelmine period: the fragmentation of the 
bourgeois middle, the hostility of bourgeois parties to the left, the importance of the 
confessional divide, the emergence of a new radical nationalism.46  Their goal was to 
restore a sense of contingency to modern German history and reject the form of 
teleological blandness that resulted from Fritz Fischer and Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s negative 
Sonderweg.47  In acknowledging that continuity occurred, they were not simply buying 
into a generalized answer to the underlying social changes of the twentieth century.  
David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley’s admission to continuity came with a rejection of 
longer-term aspects of the Sonderweg thesis, redirecting primary attention away from the 
deeper historical continuities and toward the immediate fascism-producing aspects of 
German Imperial policy and culture.48  As a result, the Sonderweg was relegated to an 
increasingly more circumscribed period and role in German history. 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer 
called for a new examination of the meaning of the German past.  Europe had moved into 
a new age in the 1990s, and as far as the continent was concerned, the twentieth century 
had become history.49  In the wake of Germany’s reunification, Jarausch and Geyer asked 
how the German past could be viewed with 2000 as its pivotal point rather than 1945.  In 
an attempt to reconcile Germany’s postwar transformation into a democratic society, 
Shattered Past addressed the void left by the collapse of three traditional “master 
12
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 narratives” of German history, which Jarausch and Geyer argued had failed to adequately 
explain the story of the German past.  The national “master narrative” lost much of its 
intellectual credibility as well as its moral authority after the Second World War, due to 
its undeniable complicity in genocide and the Holocaust; the Marxist narrative lost its 
critical edge as it became dogma; and the Sonderweg narrative postulated an incorrect 
Anglo-American method of modernization, which led to false assumptions of German 
backwardness and difference.50   
Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer saw German history as a fractured 
landscape; a narrative ruptured at particular points, specifically 1918, 1933, 1945, and 
1989.  As such, German history was plural and composed of a variety of histories.  They 
encouraged the “recognition of the very instability of the German condition and making it 
a pivotal concern of historical reconstruction.”51  In advocating a multiplicity of histories, 
Jarausch and Geyer argue that the real task in interpreting German history is 
acknowledging “the extraordinary difficulty of an emergent nation in finding a way of 
living together, in generating a civic culture to unite a diverse society, and in developing 
viable forms of participatory and peaceful protest.”52  Encouraging historians to analyze 
such themes as war and genocide, the decline of German power, and the definitions of 
national identities, Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer support the creation of new 
narratives in order to navigate the extremes of Germany’s past in the hope that they will 
“serve as guideposts in deciphering the shifting map of territories and people that make 
up the twentieth century German past.”53   
Making the claim that no single master narrative can render German history 
complete, Jarausch and Geyer pulled on separate histories.  In doing so, they discarded 
13
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 the Sonderweg thesis and dismissed the notion of continuity from German history 
altogether.  According to their interpretation of a shattered German past, the entirety of 
the German story could not possibly point to Hitler and could not be subsumed as a pre-
history of the Nazis.54  Instead, they advocated a rethinking of “German histories from 
the margins to decenter received conceptions of what it means to be German at a given 
time.”55 They called for a critical historicization of all the major themes of analysis – 
state, society, nation, and modernity – and posited that history should be the study of how 
these categories were constituted.56  Their argument cancels out the need for a coherent, 
single understanding of German history, in favor of a pluralist approach that illuminates 
the vagaries of the German past rather than drowning in a traditional historical narrative.  
In a way, Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer moved beyond the Sonderweg. 
This method of moving “beyond” is enhanced with two of Helmut Walser Smith’s 
most recent works.  Smith’s 2008 Continuities of German History details his 
understanding of the ways in which ideas and political forms are traceable across what 
historians (notably Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer) have taken to be the sharp 
breaks of history.57  The volume looks across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries at the 
strands of continuity found in nationalism, racism, and anti-Semitism in Germany, 
focusing on what Smith referred to as the “symbolic forms” of German history. His 
analysis of anti-Semitism and its connections with the evolving exclusionism of German 
communities in the nineteenth century provides the perfect illustration of Smith’s larger 
theme: German continuity.  Smith makes two assertions about continuity.  The first is that 
continuity need not imply particularity, and precisely the most important continuities 
(seen from the standpoint of twentieth-century catastrophes) are not particular to 
14
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 Germany. The second claim argues that only by considering the kind of continuity (i.e. 
anti-Semitic violence) is it possible to see the actual peculiarity, the specific tendency that 
informed later German identity structure and government policy.58  In specifically 
pointing to a longue durée of anti-Semitic tendencies in various European countries, 
Smith extends the “temporal and spatial depth of field” of German continuities en 
masse.59   
With this argument Helmut Walser Smith addresses the Sonderweg and its 
historiography as a whole.  Smith rejects Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer’s 
insistence that there are no links to be found between the various ruptures of German 
history and instead asserts a proposal for an analysis based on historical change over 
several centuries.  He argues that skepticism towards master narratives has hindered 
historians’ ability in explaining National Socialism and the Holocaust.  In acknowledging 
continuity, however, Smith does not accept the Sonderweg as part and parcel of the 
German narrative, rather he focuses on what aspects of German continuity are 
interrelated to the histories of other nations such as France and the countries of Eastern 
Europe.  The traditional Sonderweg thesis revolves around what made Germany peculiar, 
which led historians to focus on Germany alone.  Smith instead emphasizes broader 
continuities that have accompanied transformative periods of various national histories 
throughout the nineteenth century.  Smith acknowledges that these transformations have 
had specifically German variations, but insists that they remain enmeshed within a larger 
European social and political framework.60  Smith calls for a revision of historical 
understanding that constitutes an attempt “to construct bridges across chronological 
chasms.”61 
15
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 In this way, Helmut Walser Smith claims that he has moved beyond the 
Sonderweg, pushing past Jarausch and Geyer to construct a narrative of German history 
that has links to the rest of Europe.  For Smith, the legacy of predeterminism that lingers 
in German historiography is a phenomenon of the postwar period, and he asserts that the 
vacillating nature of German Sonderweg historiography is exactly what discredits it now.  
According to Smith, this weakening has largely occurred because no tenable continuity 
thesis has been put forth to replace the Sonderweg as a methodological tool to explain the 
Holocaust.  Smith argues that the end of the Sonderweg has, in effect, eliminated of much 
of the nineteenth century from the events of the early twentieth: “Previous generations of 
German historians…possessed an acute sense of the chronological depth of German and 
European history. But this sense has left us.”62 As a result, the Sonderweg as a historical 
method fails to adequately situate National Socialism in the long-term narrative of 
German history.  Several historians have attempted to fill the void.  Helmut Walser Smith 
specifically cites David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley’s work on class as a driving force of 
analysis behind continuity theses.  Many other historians also now focus on the critical 
importance of the1890s in the German narrative as the key break in modern German 
history.  Most recently, a new paradigm has emerged (Smith’s) that gives precedence to 
the historical vanishing point of 1941.  Smith’s vanishing point superimposes rationality, 
science, and the disciplining of the body into arguments for a broader European-wide 
continuity, and in doing so Smith renders German history not as the culmination of a 
separate path, but rather as “a particular variant of modernity, specifically as a nation of 
troubling modernity.” By relinquishing the notion of German peculiarity, the causal 
streams of German history can be analyzed on their own. In Smith’s case, nationalism 
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 and ethnic antagonism can be emphasized as powerful currents without claiming a unique 
status for German variations of European ideologies. As a result, beyond the Sonderweg 
exists “a deeper chronological sense to our explanation of the twentieth century, and…the 
possibility that in our explanation of German history, and the twentieth-century 
catastrophe it brought forth, we [can] situate the German past in a denser weave of 
international and transnational history.”63 
This international history encompasses the extremes of violence and pain as well 
as wealth and happiness.  Deftly described by Jarausch and Geyer, “the 
incommensurability of simultaneous man-made life-worlds of utter privilege, wealth, and 
consumption and death-worlds of utter degradation, starvation, and brutal annihilation,” 
is the sign of twentieth century German history.”64 This is what the Sonderweg thesis 
tries to encompass.  It searches for the reasons behind the German catastrophe not just in 
political pathologies but also in economic problems, social disintegration, and cultural 
tropes.  In the 1960s the Sonderweg surfaced as a retrospective teleology of modern 
German history that allowed Germans to analyze their past in a different way, to separate 
an evil past from a better present.65  As the postwar period wore on, the paradigm lost its 
ability to answer new questions posed by reunification and the postmodernist shift. 
Nevertheless, the Sonderweg remains a powerful explanatory tool.  Helmut Walser Smith 
claims we have left the Sonderweg behind, yet it cannot be denied that it continues to 
leave an indelible impression on contemporary German historiography – after all, Smith 
could not compose his theories without addressing it.  The causal streams Smith urges 
historians to follow are a product of a historical understanding of the German past created 
by the Sonderweg, and David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley make the case that had Fritz 
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 Fischer and Hans-Ulrich Wehler not existed it would have been necessary to invent 
them.66 
The Weimar Moment 
What is the place of National Socialism in German history?  That is the question 
which has informed much, if not all, German historiography in the post-Fischer era.  In 
Sonderweg historiography, the answer to that question rests on two historical 
assumptions: that an understanding of the greater German past necessitates an inherently 
negative diagnosis of German ills, and that this diagnosis is a product of and hinges on 
the emergence of National Socialism in Germany.  What if we excluded National 
Socialism from German history – not by making it out to be a momentary aberration, but 
rather by analyzing the period before the Nazi Party existed?  When, where, and in what 
form, then, does the notion of a “separate path” take hold in Germany?  In the writings of 
Hugo Ball, Thomas Mann, and Robert Musil the various “peculiarities” of contemporary 
historiography can be broken down in a new context, and the Sonderweg is revealed as a 
cultural artifact of a “Weimar moment,” used by Germans to reconstruct their society and 
identity in the aftermath of the First World War.    
Reorienting the Sonderweg in the Weimar period requires an adjustment of 
Helmut Walser Smith’s “vanishing point.”  In the way that the postwar Sonderweg debate 
hinges on National Socialism, 1914 serves as the catalyst for an interwar Sonderweg.  In 
understanding the “spirit of 1914,” one gets a glimpse of the intellectual climate that 
produced what was essentially a Sonderweg diagnosis in the 1920s, as well as the 
problems which that diagnosis was designed to address.  Labeled as the social artifact of 
an “ideological syndrome” and as a product of “war psychosis,”67 the spirit of 1914 in 
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 Germany, according to Peter Gay, reached levels of absurdity: the war offered 
“purification, liberation, and enormous hope, … it set hearts of poets aflame, … and the 
Germans had at last united as a Volk.”68  For many Germans, August 1914 was a historic 
turning point, the first step towards the recreation of the German nation on a more exalted 
level.  This path to recreation underpinned a specific German mission, which Wolfgang 
Mommsen argues lay at the heart of the positive nineteenth century Sonderweg – an 
ideological framework at play within the German social and political structures of the 
period.69   
However, this mission revealed the dangerous underbelly of 1914 – that the world 
“should find recuperation in the German spirit, and that the war was justifiable as a 
means to this end” – which, simply stated, meant victory at all costs.70  According to 
Mommsen, this ideological soil established a wholly uncritical belief in German 
superiority, both intellectual and martial, along with a willingness to impose that 
superiority on others by force.71  As evidenced by a contribution to the Hamburger 
Nachrichten dated November 1914 (written by Major-General von Disfurth), Germany 
meant business: “We are and must be barbarians, if by this we understand those who 
wage war relentlessly and to the uttermost degree.”72  The best-known example of early 
wartime German propaganda is the “Appeal by the 93.”  Signed by ninety-three 
prominent German intellectuals, the Appeal was an attempt by leading academics to 
protest the “lies and calumny” spread by the Allies in order to stain Germany’s honor in 
her struggle for existence in 1914.73  The Appeal belies a genuine belief that a declaration 
by important men would cure the misunderstanding between Germany and the world, and 
it reveals a surprise that anyone would have doubted German honor.  More importantly, 
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 the document was signed by men utterly out of their minds with excitement for the 
German cause. 
Yet, this initial elation turned into depression as the wave of chauvinism was 
followed by guilt and shame after the German defeat in 1918 and the proclamation of the 
Weimar Republic on November 9 by  Social Democrat Philipp Scheidemann.  At that 
point German troops were still on foreign soil and in total disarray, the General Staff was 
still frantically scrambling for martial peace, and the entire Imperial administration was 
demoralized and discredited.74  Thus, the Republic was born in turmoil.  The Weimar 
period was left to pick up the pieces of a broken German nation.  In Walter Gropius’ 
words: “[It] was more than just a lost war.  A world [had] come to an end,” and Weimar 
had to seek radical solutions to Germany’s problems75 - “there was endemic disorder… 
desperate hunger … demoralization among intellectuals… an army to be brought home 
and demobilized… [and] there were bitter wounds to be healed and no time to heal 
them.”76 
The demoralized intellectuals of the 1920s dealt with the baggage of a previous 
generation of intelligentsia who had forsaken their traditional roles in favor of wartime 
indoctrination.  The post-1918 world hailed the “Appeal by the 93” as “the treason of the 
intellectuals.”77  John Jay Chapman, in his analysis of the Appeal, asked, were these not 
the greatest minds in Germany?78  The mandarins of German society had signed a 
document that exuded an emotional nationalistic fervor quite contrary to the traditional 
aloof nature of German academics.79  Moreover, it seems as though they signed it gladly, 
and in doing so they proclaimed the solidarity of German intellectual and cultural elites 
with official Imperial policies and Prussian militarism.  Wolfgang Mommsen lists a 
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 number of intellectuals who actually enlisted in the war effort – Hugo Ball (whose 
subsequent disillusionment will be discussed below), Max Beckmann, Hermann Hesse, 
and Ernst Toller – and detailed the work of those who lent their formidable intellectual 
abilities to the homefront (Friedrich Meinecke, Werner Sombart, and Max Scheler). 
By November 1918, the war was seen “as a superhuman cataclysm about which 
nothing could be done and which had to be endured and mastered by aesthetic means.”80  
This aesthetic means of endurance and hopeful recovery transitioned into the Weimar 
Era.  As such, the Weimar Republic is the physical reflection of a German identity crisis 
in the aftermath of the First World War.  The issue of how Germany was to be 
represented, and essentially reconstructed, in the interwar period is highly significant to 
this discussion of the Sonderweg because its practical and symbolic elements are 
inextricably linked to the creation of a new Germany in the 1920s.  Today the Republic 
plays a pivotal role in twenty-first century conceptions of German identity.  Founded in 
the “classical center,” home of Goethe and Schiller, Weimar is associated with the first 
attempt at truly democratic forms of political and social emancipation in Germany.81   
Quoting Peter Gay, when we think of Weimar, 
 
we think of modernity in art, literature, and thought; we think of the rebellion of 
sons against fathers, Dadaists against art, Berliners against beefy philistinism, 
libertines against old-fashioned moralists; we think of The Threepenny Opera, 
The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari, The Magic Mountain, the Bauhaus, Marlene 
Dietrich.82 
 
According to Gay, traditional historiography of the Weimar era has come to view the 
period between 1918 and 1933 as a period of turmoil, filled with highs and lows, 
struggling to define itself in the face of revolution and disenchantment, but above all 
invested in the recreation of the German nation, both politically and culturally.    
21
Everett: The Genesis of the Sonderweg
Published by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository, 2015
 Emerging from the German Revolution in November of 1918, the Republic 
engaged in a commerce of ideas that struggled to reinvent the German nation in the face 
of military defeat.  It was the task of the Weimar Republic to create new ties between the 
traditional Imperial system and the future democratic state. Regarded as perhaps the most 
challenging obstacle for the new regime to surmount, the 1919 Peace of Versailles has 
spawned myths that continue to color historical understandings of the Weimar Republic 
today.  Known as the “War Guilt Clause,” Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty legally 
impugned the German nation with responsibility for the Great War, and by signing the 
Treaty, Germany was required to disarm and pay millions in reparations to its former 
Allied adversaries.  The Versailles Treaty was considered a constant and deliberate 
humiliation by the German people, a long and calculated affront that ate away at the 
morale of the Republic from the inside out.  As a result, the anguish of defeat and sense 
of guilt imparted by Versailles saddled the Weimar Republic with a damaging legend that 
would influence its legacy throughout the following century.  Despite such malign, 
however, the Weimar Constitution has been hailed as a symbol of revolution, giving 
shape to the Republic and providing and outlet for a new generation of German society to 
test its abilities and reach for new heights of cultural and political acclaim.   
How did the Germans of the 1920s view their own era?  The facilitator of Weimar 
thought, according to Peter Gay, was a “community of reason.”83  Devoted to radical 
inquiry, open to ideas considered impossible or scandalous to previous generations, the 
community facilitated a new Weimar spirit.  Weimar came to symbolize a hope for a new 
start.  The revolutionary moment in 1918 had highlighted the differences between the 
emergent Germany and its recent past: lyrical poetry as opposed to military swagger, 
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 Humanist philosophy as opposed to the submission to authority, pacific cosmopolitanism 
as opposed to an aggressive foreign policy.84  Reform and reconstruction were required in 
the Weimar period as result of the desperate and practical need to unify these two 
worldviews into a cohesive cultural, political, and intellectual front.  Emphasis on 
understanding the world – and by understanding it, changing it – became the community 
of reason’s intellectual creed.  Their new understanding began with Germany herself.  
As part of this community of reason, Hugo Ball and his Critique of the German 
Intelligentsia (1919)85, Thomas Mann and his Order of the Day (1942), and Robert 
Musil’s Precision and Soul (1911-1937) offer representative accounts of how Germany 
negotiated the Weimar period on an intellectual level.  The single thread that unites each 
piece is the outbreak of war in 1914.  Each intellectual has very different conclusions 
about and solutions for Germany’s problems in the 1920s, but they all reach those 
conclusions in the same way: each develop a critique of the German past that hinges on 
the calamity of 1914.  Ball’s Critique is perhaps the community of reason’s earliest 
attempt to reorient Germany’s past, present, and future with its defeat in 1918.  “It was 
supposed to be a book about the modern intellectuals, especially about the authors of Die 
Wießen Blätter” (the blank check), but it became “a sketch of German development and 
more like a draft against the Manifesto of the 93 Intellectuals.”86  At their most basic 
level, Ball, Mann, and Musil wrote passionate indictments of the German past for its 
social, political, and cultural failings in the run up to the First World War, and each work 
identifies major issues in German political, intellectual, and cultural history in an effort to 
formulate possible solutions to one of the most significant European problems of the 
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 twentieth century: Germany.  In Ball’s words, they sought “to trace the principles that put 
the German characters at odds with the rest of the world.”87 
A Kingdom of All Human Beings 
Born February 22, 1886, in Pirmasens to a Catholic family, Hugo Ball was a 
German author, poet, and leading Dada artist. Ironically, and like many other young 
artists and intellectuals, Ball enthusiastically volunteered for military service in August of 
1914.  As a letter to a friend on August 7 reads, “War is the only thing that excites me.”88  
However, after three successive rejections on medical grounds, Ball abandoned his 
military aspirations and instead made a trip to the Belgian front lines in November 1914 
as a private citizen.  Ball’s diary entries about the visit illustrate the impact of the war on 
his thoughts: “It is the total mass machinery and the devil himself that has broken loose 
now.  Ideals are only labels that have been stuck on.  Everything has been shaken to its 
foundations.”89  Taking on an increasingly nihilistic tone, Ball quickly turned on the war 
effort and declared himself a pacifist in January 1915.90   By May, he had fled Germany 
to Switzerland in a self-imposed exile, and would emerge in the period from 1914 to 
1918 as a cofounder of Zurich Dada, a distinguished Expressionist poet and playwright, 
and a dogged anti-war publicist.  Arriving in Bern in 1917, the center of political anti-war 
activity on the continent, Ball gathered with a group of fellow émigré intellectuals, 
including Annette Kolb, René Schickele, and Ernst Bloch, around the newly formed anti-
war journal Die Freie Zeitung.91  Politically the journal supported the Entente while 
consistently denouncing German militarism, nationalism, and the Prussian aristocracy. 
For Ball the war represented, “the final phase of a permanent, commensurate with its 
nature, barbaric protest of Germany against the Western spirit,” and his resolution to 
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 engage in anti-war resistance (a decision he called not only just, but the highest duty) 
resulted in Critique of the German Intelligentsia (Zur Kritik der deutschen Intelligenz).92 
The Critique, Ball’s first major work, is an important document of its time.  Its 
major themes (art vs. politics, materialism vs. spirituality, individual vs. collective) 
stemmed from the major crises that occurred during the Critique’s conception.  To 
contextualize the piece, in November 1917 the Bolshevik revolution occurred in Russia; 
President Wilson’s Fourteen Points hit the international stage in January 1918; Max von 
Baden took power in Germany on October 4; Kiel fell on November 2; Munich fell 
November 7; and revolution broke out in Berlin on November 9.  These dates are 
significant for they frame Ball’s larger analysis of a German problem.  The Critique is an 
investigation of the German mind, and it operates on two levels: it confronts 
contemporary issues and reconstructive currents in German politics post-1918, and it also 
proposes a specific teleology of the German past in accordance with Ball’s goal of 
German salvation in the 1920s. 93  Ball proposed a radical revision of German thought, 
identifying major issues in German political, intellectual, and cultural history in an effort 
to formulate possible solutions to one of the most significant European problems of the 
twentieth century: German militarism and nationalism.  The Critique can be broken down 
into five major concerns: an attempt to deal with the history of Prussia that, according to 
Ball, lay in the historical ties between Martin Luther and the Prussian state; a concern 
with and a critique of what Ball understood as a typically Prussian ethos; a need to 
analyze the true nature of the First World War, which for Ball was a result of the lack of 
democratic tradition in Germany; the controversial proclamation that the Entente was 
fighting a just war; and Ball’s conviction that the solution to war lay not in negotiation, 
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 but in Germany’s recognition of guilt.94  The Critique’s foreword concludes with the 
question, “Have the Germans lost all their senses?”95  Ball’s entire work is an attempt to 
salvage those senses and to reorient them to the post-1918 world. 
The Critique points to the Middle Ages as the source of twentieth-century Pan-
German mentality.  Ball traced the origins of Pan-Germanism to the conflict between the 
Pope and Kaiser: “The medieval universal state of pope and Kaisers initiated an intimate 
connection between the German populace and Italy… [thus] the powerful German kings 
[became] merely the avenging sword and executioner of Roman will.”96  As a 
consequence, German theology of the Middle Ages was tied to the sword, and German 
prestige was built upon blood and iron.  From the Middle Ages, Ball  moved on to Luther 
as the pivoting point of German history.  According to Ball, Luther separated Germany 
from Rome and was the first person to claim that, based on the Bible, state authority had 
a divine origin.97  In doing so, “God [became] a tool of monarchy.  Morals and religion 
[were] subordinated to the omnipotence of state power,” and as a result Ball made the 
claim that one deep rooted cause of the First World was the Reformation of the 
nineteenth century.98  “Luther removed the shackles from the feudal rulers,” and thus “he 
bears the responsibility for the fact that in Germany [in the twentieth century] there is still 
no effective political conscience in matters of foreign policy.”99 
Parallel to his treatment of the Reformation’s confessional divide, Ball also 
analyzed Germany’s divergence from Western tradition.  In tracing the implementation of 
Protestant theology in German philosophy, Ball contrasted the German Aufklärung with 
the French Revolution.100  According to Ball, “the rebellious spirit of the rest of Europe 
moved in opposite directions to German institutions, away from that feudal ethos of 
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 rulership, that diplomacy of special priorities, that militarism of conscience.”101  In 
Germany, the Enlightenment asserted itself with some difficulty against Luther’s 
Protestant theology, and as a result, according to Ball, self-determination, freedom, 
equality, and brotherhood fell on deaf ears.  Ball singled out Kant and Hegel as Luther’s 
counter-revolutionary prodigies by tying a conspiracy against progress to the rise of 
Prussian preeminence in the nineteenth century.102  Kant, according to Ball, elevated 
Prussian power to unparalleled heights, and Hegel in turn verified the world historical 
destiny of the Prussian state – Prussia became 
A universal state where worldly interest superseded divine ones; where Berlin 
offered a shameless substitute for Rome and an omnipotent clergy of bureaucrats 
as a substitute for the priesthood; where a new scholasticism emerged under the 
name of state pragmatism; and where the Prussian king, with the aid of his 
ministers and professors, ruled over the abject penitentiary world of his subjects as 
its highest and worldly power.103 
 
Ball thus sees Bismarck and the creation of the German state in 1871 as the culmination 
of a religious process begun by Luther, carried into philosophy by Kant and Hegel, and 
reaching the zenith of its political expression in the Wars of Unification.  For Ball, 
Bismarck’s rise then signaled “the final invasion of Teutonic barbarism into Latin 
civilization: World War One.”104  Ball labeled the trend as the intellectual sickness of a 
nation, and in doing created a cultural narrative of German history anchored in a negative 
teleology – a negative Sonderweg.  
 In order to bring Germany back to the correct path, Ball proposed the formation 
of a new “church of the intelligentsia,” creating a new community, a “kingdom of all 
human beings who are of a single good will.”105   “The German people must open their 
eyes … we are demanding democracy… [and] the proclamation of new human and 
national rights concludes the war.”106   Ball would have had Germany align with the West 
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 and turn towards the democratic principles of the French Revolution.  Germany’s princes 
would be subject to a spiritual authority, its nationalism cast out in the name of a free 
Europe – it was a task of a new order: 
… this regime must fall, either through surrender of its weapons, through 
collapse of its economy or through the united intellectual effort of its 
revolutionaries… this nation, in short, must be condemned and cast down if there 
are to be guarantees for the reconstruction of humanity, for a world republic, for 
the work of freedom on behalf of the salvation of afflicted people… it will be the 
task of a responsible intelligentsia…107 
 
Ball believed that only a clean break with the past would allow for new thinking and the 
construction of a reformed Germany.  For him it was imperative that Germany seek to 
establish the highest principle of humanity and freedom, and to do so with the same 
fervor with which they had “plunged the world into misfortune, suffering and rubble.”108  
The new church of the intelligentsia was tasked with righting Germany’s past wrongs, 
and forging a new German path out of the old one. 
A German Democracy 
 Thomas Mann was a German novelist, short story writer, and social critic.  Born 
in Lübeck in 1875, Mann’s first short story, Little Mr. Friedemann (Der Kleiner Herr 
Friedemann), was published in 1898.  His novels, the most famous of which are 
Buddenbrooks: The Decline of a Family and The Magic Mountain (Der Zauberberg), 
garnered international acclaim, and his analysis and critique of the German mind is noted 
for its political insight into the Weimar era.  Mann’s Order of the Day, published in 1942, 
is a collection of political essays spanning the interwar and Nazi eras.  Mann’s work in 
the 1920s is in stark contrast to his writings during the First World War, specifically the 
anti-political, anti-democratic manifesto published at the close of the conflict.  In 1918, 
Mann’s Reflections of a Non-Political Man (Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen) was 
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 published as a riposte to his brother Heinrich’s criticism of Germany and the war effort.  
The piece justified the authoritarianism and inward “culture” (Kultur) of Germany 
against the moralistic “civilization” (Zivilisation) and democracy of England and France.  
Mann stated that “[democracy] is a politics that is hostile to Germany,” and he was 
deeply convinced that “the German people will never be able to love political democracy, 
… that the much decried ‘authoritarian state’ is and remains the one that is proper and 
becoming to the German people.”109  Writing in 1918, Mann believed that the German 
will to power remained uncontested in its legitimacy and its aims.  An excerpt from his 
diary illuminates how Mann felt a month and a half before the armistice was signed: 
“Thought once again how good it would be if I were to die now.”110  Mann believed that 
the Allies wanted to drive Goethe, Luther, Frederick the Great, and Bismarck out of the 
German experience so that they could adjust themselves to democracy, and he would 
never recant his statements.111   
 What changed then?  How did Mann make the conversion into what Peter Gay 
has referred to as a “republican intellectual” (Vernunftrepublikaner)?112  Many of Mann’s 
biographers and analysts of his work have expressed doubt in the conventional 
understanding that Mann simply left behind the undemocratic, highly conservative 
positions of Reflections, and many have questioned his motives in doing so.113  However, 
what matters is the fact that he did indeed write and publish a series of speeches and 
novels that, whether directly or indirectly, consistently underlined his democratic 
conversion in the 1920s, and supported the increasingly beleaguered Republic throughout 
the period.  As early as 1921, in an unpublished essay on Jews, Mann attacked the 
nascent “swastika-nonsense” invading Germany, and for the rest of the decade (and 
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 beyond) Mann was considered the German Republic’s staunchest defender.114  Mann’s 
aim in the 1920s, expressed quite candidly in his speech, “Of the German Republic,” 
given on October 13, 1923, “was to win you [the German people] to the side of the 
Republic; to the side of what is called democracy, and what I call humanity.”115  His goal, 
though many sectors of the German public had sworn off the Republic, was to establish a 
relationship between the Republic, democracy, and the German people, and “Of the 
German Republic” ends with a call for humanity: “we are honoring its explicit legal 
form, whose meaning and aim we take to be the unification of our political and national 
life, when we yield our still stiff and unaccustomed tongues to utter the cry: ‘Long live 
the Republic!’”116 
 Mann’s objective was to build bridges between German culture and the wider 
world in the wake of the First World War.  His mission was to explain Germany to the 
world at large, and his larger œuvre is representative of German responses to defeat in 
1918.  Mann found himself among the losers in 1918, those who had fervently supported 
German war aims, and he was left to try and reconcile the German Republic and a 
discredited value system with the new democratic principles of Weimar.  He, like the rest 
of Germany, was faced with a set of questions: could there be human politics in modern 
mass societies; was there any future left in Enlightenment humanism, liberalism, and 
democracy; was totalitarianism the inevitable shape of things to come?117  Mann believed 
that it was his duty to work towards a new understanding of Germany, and his endeavors 
make it possible to gain understanding of the so-called German catastrophe.118  
 Mann understood that the effort Germany had to make in order “to modernize, 
democratize herself, sweeping away the old, romantic imperial Germany” was a task that 
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 could only proceed “agonizingly and against the grain, meeting extreme resistance 
because the old Germany [was] much to deeply and firmly established in men’s souls, 
[was] much to deeply identified, perhaps, with Germanism itself.”119  Oddly enough, that 
statement came in September of 1918, but it rang true for the entire span of the Weimar 
era.  Mann and the rest of the community of reason were faced with a struggle against 
“the frightful, world-menacing thing” that Mann understood as one of the two 
ineradicable forces of the German heart: on one side the devotion to antiquity and an 
attachment to ancestors and an old glorious dynasty, and on the other the enchanting 
feeling of freedom, pride in human equality, and individual right.120  It was his goal to 
understand the German mind, to assess its past, analyze its present, and provide hope for 
its future. 
 To Mann, the German past represented an irrationalist narrative that repudiated 
reason and whose mental attitude rejected freedom, justice, culture, optimism, and a faith 
in progress.  The nineteenth century particularly, according to Mann, represented a period 
of intellectual taboo in Germany that rejected the liberal sentiments of the French 
Revolution and was characterized for its absolute unrestraint and its “orgiastic, radically 
anti-humane, [and] frenzied dynamic character.”121 Mann points to a German 
Weltanschauung (worldview) that flowed from academic and professional spheres – a 
wave of intellectual and pseudo-intellectual currents that brought forth “anomalous 
barbarism [and] primitive popular vulgarity.”122 According to Mann, reason had veiled its 
face in Germany and “humanity seems to have run like boys let out of school away from 
the humanitarian, idealistic nineteenth century.”123  The First World War, then, was the 
emancipation of this pent up brutality, an unleashing of a German dictatorship of force on 
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 the world, which created a fanatic state of mind complete with hallelujahs and bell-
ringing until every German foamed at the mouth. 
 When Mann spoke out in favor of the Weimar Republic, giving “Of the German 
Republic” as a lecture in the Beethovensaal in Berlin, he had his misgivings, aware of “its 
weaknesses, the inadequacy of its revolutionary momentum, and even its errors of 
principle.” What drove him to the arena was “the feeling that it was [his] duty to pledge 
all the intellectual credit [he] had… to struggle against the frightful, world-menacing 
thing which [he] saw growing and increasing.” Mann understood Germany’s past as that 
“world-menacing thing,” and he believed that Germany’s fate belonged to the Republic.  
He believed that there was such a thing as a “German democracy” and to think that the 
phrase must refer to “some outlandish kind of foreign humbug [was] mere 
childishness.”124 For Mann, the solution to Germany’s ills was to link the better aspects 
of Germany’s past (the Goethean era of culture and intellectual experience) with the 
promise of the Weimar future (democracy), taking the first steps towards liberation and 
rehabilitation.   
Jettisoning “German” 
The Austrian essayist Robert Musil was one of the great critical and imaginative 
minds of the twentieth century.  Born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1880, it should 
be noted that although Musil was not a native German, reserving Musil for a specifically 
Austrian tradition distorts his relationship to Europe as a whole and the broadly shared 
concerns of his generation.125  Musil’s philosophical and literary concerns were mediated 
though the German language and his identity was shaped in terms of the wider sphere of 
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 German culture.  Politically, he identified himself with the fate of the German nation and 
made a name for himself as a specifically German intellectual.  
Musil was a witness to and a participant in the ideological upheaval of both the 
First and Second World Wars.  His initial success came in 1906 with the publication of 
his first novel, The Confusions of Young Törless (Die Verwirrungen des Zöglings 
Törleß), and for much of his career Musil was a working journalist writing serious 
articles on culture, contributing to the literary feuilleton of newspapers, and reviewing 
books and plays for various publications.126  His insights revealed a German and 
European culture in crisis.   The purpose of Musil’s Precision and Soul (a collection of 
essays taken and translated from Musil’s larger Gesammelte Werke, written between 
1911 and 1937) was to engage his readers’ thoughts and feelings directly with the 
problems of modern culture.  Historically, these essays open a window as to what it felt 
like to be a committed intellectual in Germany and Austria in the interwar period – not 
indifferent, but a passionate observer.127  Musil’s significance emerged at a point at 
which the European conventions of ideology, form, and language began to break down.  
The task he set himself was to think through the spiritual experience of his generation 
socially, culturally, and intellectually.128   
 The only member of this study’s trio to actively participate in the First World 
War, Musil attended the Militär-Oberrealschule in Hranice and took part in officer 
training at the Technische Militärakademie in Vienna, fully enlisting for military service 
in 1901.  Between 1914 and 1918 he served as an Austrian officer on the Italian front and 
was decorated several times.  He then went on to serve as the editor of a military 
newspaper and a bureaucrat within the Republican Defense Ministry in Austria after the 
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 collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918.  The war, according to Musil, “erupted 
like a disease in this social organism; and enormous pent-up energy … [that] finally dug 
itself [a] gangrenous fistula in the twentieth century.”129  The overriding concern of 
Musil’s post-1918 work was thus the larger catastrophe of German culture and ideology 
that found expression in the Great War.  
 It was clear to Musil that the elements of 1914 were already present in the 
nineteenth century – “one thing after another, it all came into being, and today it is once 
again all present at the same time.”130  German identity in 1914 was composed of a long 
list of symptoms that, according to Musil, reached back a century, including nationalism, 
religion, and an antagonism to science. Musil believed, however, that the disconnect 
between what he referred to as “precision” and “soul” (the collective and the individual, 
respectively) represented the most significant factor in creating the Germans of the 
nineteenth century.  His analysis of a German “special path” was couched in the German 
need to shape its identity in such a way to isolate precision and soul, and the complex 
array of results that identity heralded in 1914.  According to Musil the antithesis between 
precision and soul was embodied by the relationship between the German individual and 
the German state.  Musil made the claim that Germans regarded the state as an institution 
for human perfectibility, and as such German identity became wholly dependent on the 
state.  In effect, the collective subsumed the individual, and Musil believed that the 
ideology of the German state had deepened “to the point of idolatry… seeing in it both an 
institution for the perfection of human nature and a kind of spiritual superperson.”131 
 At the turn of the century, however, that identity became a problem, as many 
Germans sought to reclaim the soul they seemed to have lost.  Musil believed that this 
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 struggle against soullessness degenerated into hysterics on the eve of the First World 
War, and in 1918 he saw Europe as teetering on the verge of apocalyptic change as a 
result of the German identity crisis.  Solving the identity crisis, Musil maintained, was a 
necessary obstacle to overcome in order to arrive at a new epoch for the world.132  His 
solution lay “neither in waiting for a new ideology nor in the clash of the ones that are 
quarreling today, but in the creation of social conditions that safeguard the stability and 
depth of ideological endeavors in general.”133  Musil’s answer lay in jettisoning the 
“German” identity as a whole.  Musil promoted man as man, rather than man as 
“German” or “French” or “European.”  By labeling oneself, Musil believed that the 
individual became isolated and the “other” not like him became dehumanized.  This, to 
Musil, was the ultimate consequence of Western civilization as a whole and the greatest 
problem that the new age had to overcome.  In describing “The German as Symptom” 
(one of the essays within Precision and Soul) Musil believed he was raising the problem 
of civilization as a collective.  In order for Germany, and the rest of Europe, to right 
themselves, a larger supra-identity had to by assumed by all of Europe, if not the entire 
global community.  According to Musil, the disconnect between precision and soul was a 
product of Western civilization and Germany was the most visual symptom. 
Today’s Sonderweg 
Together, Ball, Mann and Musil represent an important intellectual facet of the 
Weimar period. In reading their works together, one begins to understand that much of 
the reassessment of Germany’s place in Europe after defeat in the First World War 
tended to inhabit a tense position between robust apologetics for Germany’s special place 
in European history and subtle doubts about the implication of its recent past; in other 
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 words, toward a portrayal of Germany as a country unmoored from the rest of Western 
civilization.  In short, the language of these thinkers suggests that the Sonderweg, far 
from being an interpretive invention of the 1960s, was in fact encoded into the very DNA 
of German thought.  This project has traced the contours of this discussion, and considers 
the implications of pushing back the clock on Fritz Fischer’s theory, thereby opening the 
door for a reconsideration of notions of continuity in German history. 
The nineteenth century accommodated a long list of contradictions – 
individualism and social solidarity, aristocracy and socialism, pacifism and militarism, 
nationalism and internationalism, religion and natural science – and these contradictions 
lasted in to the Weimar period in Germany (perhaps best illustrated by the visual contrast 
of pacifists shaking hands with Entente leaders alongside the assassination of Weimar 
politicians).  Precision and Soul is Musil’s most complete account of the ideological 
crisis of German culture, but it is much more than just a catalogue of Germany’s ills.  It 
speaks to a larger audience and was intended to be much more than a simple diagnosis.  
Indeed Ball, Mann, and Musil, each took a moment in their works to outline a prognosis 
alongside their respective Sonderwege. Ball emphasized the creation of a new 
intelligentsia; Mann pointed to democracy; and Musil believed that the unification of 
“precision” and “soul” would usher in a new age for Germany and Europe as a whole.  
As such, the 1920s the notion of a German Sonderweg is more than just a backwards 
narrative, it also looks ahead.  Built into the understanding of the German past is an 
inherent hope for the future, a hope that if the Germans can discover what is wrong with 
Germany they can fix it.  Interpreted in such a way, the Sonderweg thesis emerges not as 
a creation of postwar historiographical discussion, but rather as a powerful intellectual 
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 agent in its own right, used in the interwar period to construct a cultural narrative of 
German history that sought to provide solutions to Weimar problems.   
As a result, the construction of German identity in the twentieth century is not 
premised on the knowledge of what came “after” (the Nazi period), and instead the 
Sonderweg is revealed as cultural artifact, used to both define Germany’s past and help 
organize its future.  This is what makes the 1920s so distinct from the postwar 
historiography.  Postwar conceptions of the German Sonderweg are reflections of a much 
broader trend in German thought.  After the Second World War, notions of the 
Sonderweg became a favorite of social historians looking for ways to place the rise of 
Nazism and the Holocaust in the longer stream of German history.  Since the 1980s, 
however, such continuity theses have come under sustained attack, leaving scholars 
without an overarching paradigm for explaining the catastrophes of the twentieth century.  
Contemporary historians like Konrad Jarausch and Helmut Walser Smith are in favor of 
entirely eschewing the notion of a German Sonderweg and have posited new ways of 
analyzing the German past.  Jarausch maintains that the goal of postwar historiography is 
to “recivilize” the German past, but one cannot talk about recivilizing the post-1945 
world without buying into the idea that what came “before” was wrong.  Historians thus 
find themselves at a cross roads, unable to defend the Sonderweg thesis satisfactorily but 
unwilling to let it go completely.  By revealing the ways in which Sonderweg tropes have 
appeared in early twentieth-century writing, this study has shown how the 
historiographical difficulties are inseparable from larger patterns in German historical 
thought, thus offering a new perspective on this longstanding debate. 
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